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PROPERTY LAW AND CIVIL PROCEDURE—ESTABLISHING 
PRECEDENT FOR AFHA ENFORCEMENT AND REVISING ARKANSAS’S LAW 
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES. WATKINS V. TURNER, 2016 ARK. APP. 158, 2016 
WL 903765. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“This is your eviction notice,” your landlord says as he points a pistol 
at your one-year-old daughter and her mother, six-months pregnant and 
noticeably with child.1 The owner of your home boasts of his experience in 
“coon hunting”2 and laughs at his own wit.3 You, an African-American man 
living in the state that arguably has the worst tenant laws in the country, 
freeze under a tangible threat clearly accompanied by racially-motivated 
aggression.4 Humiliated, frightened, offended, and emasculated, you stand 
by unable to protect your family.5 
Eventually, the police arrive and end the assault but you are too 
terrified to remain in your home or to take the time to collect your 
belongings, and the experience was so traumatic that you cannot put it 
completely behind you.6 Now you would likely be asking, “What will my 
legal system do for me?” 
These astonishing events prompted the decision in Watkins v. Turner.7 
Fortunately, the real-life tenants described above achieved a notable victory 
when the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s enforcement of 
the Arkansas Fair Housing Act (“AFHA”)8 and upheld an order requiring 
the defendant to pay compensatory and punitive damages for his conduct.9 
The decision is significant both because it is Arkansas’s only precedent of 
AFHA enforcement, and because the court upheld an award of punitive 
damages even though the case reached its disposition through a default 
judgment that was awarded as a discovery sanction.10 
 
 1. Watkins v. Turner, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1; Abstract, 
Addendum & Brief for Appellant Ruben Watkins at AB. 7, AB. 13, AB. 23, Watkins, 2016 
Ark. App. 158, 2016 WL 903765 (No. CV-15-845), 2015 WL 10433756, at *7, *13, *24. 
 2. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 3. Brief for Appellant at AB 13, Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, 2016 WL 903765 (No. 
CV-15-845), 2015 WL 104337, at *13. 
 4. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at *13. 
 5. Id. at *13–14, *16. 
 6. Id. at *15. 
 7. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 8. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-201 (Repl. 2016). 
 9. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 7, 9, 2016 WL 903765, at *4–5. 
 10. Id. at 8–9, 2016 WL 903765, at *4–5. 
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Prior to this decision, it was unclear whether an award of punitive 
damages under those specific circumstances was proper in Arkansas due to 
the holding in Tricou v. ACI Management, Inc.11 In Watkins, the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals limited the Tricou holding and set its first precedent for 
enforcing the AFHA.12 This note argues that Watkins is an indispensable 
decision because its contributions to both landlord-tenant law and civil 
procedure are necessary to effectively carry out justice within the state of 
Arkansas. 
Part II of this note explores the AFHA,13 the general law of punitive 
damages,14 and the backgrounds of Tricou15 and Watkins.16 Part III argues 
that Watkins is a critical addition to Arkansas’s appellate case law because 
judicial enforcement of the AFHA will increase the act’s power to protect 
victims of housing discrimination.17 Next, Part IV argues that the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals correctly decided to permit punitive damages to be 
imposed in cases that result from a default judgment entered as a discovery 
sanction because it established case law that is consistent with public policy 
and the purpose of punitive damages.18 Finally, Part V concludes the note.19 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Arkansas Fair Housing Act and Arkansas Fair Housing 
Commission Are Intended to Prevent and Remedy Housing 
Discrimination Within the State  
1. Purpose and Basic Provisions 
The Arkansas General Assembly intended the Arkansas Fair Housing 
Act (AFHA) to be “substantially equivalent” to its federal counterpart.20 The 
AFHA subchapter consists of ten sections that list and define the conduct 
that the law prohibits, which includes prohibiting landlords from 
discriminating against tenants in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a real 
estate transaction and from threatening, intimidating, or interfering with 
tenants in their enjoyment of the dwelling on the basis of race, color, 
 
 11. Tricou v. ACI Mgmt., Inc., 37 Ark. App. 51, 823 S.W.2d 924 (1992); HOWARD W. 
BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 9:4 (Nov. 2017 Update). 
 12. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 8, 2016 WL 903765 at *4. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 16. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-203(b) (Repl. 2016). 
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disability, national origin, sex, or familial status.21 It authorizes victims of a 
violation to seek recourse through a civil action,22 but the subsequent 
subchapter offers an alternative to the judicial system by creating an agency, 
the Arkansas Fair Housing Commission (“Commission”), for the specific 
purpose of enforcing the AFHA.23 
In addition to creating the Commission, the subchapter that follows the 
AFHA also defines the composition of the Commission, sets out its duties, 
outlines the procedures it must follow in evaluating a complaint, more 
thoroughly describes discriminatory conduct, and delineates the options and 
remedies available to victims of housing discrimination.24 The Commission 
exists to “ensure every Arkansan’s access to fair and equitable housing,” 
and it is “dedicated to eradicating housing discrimination in Arkansas.”25 In 
its pursuit of those goals the Commission is responsible for educating the 
public about its right to fair housing; investigating claims of alleged 
violations; and pursuing claims when there is reasonable cause to believe 
that a violation has occurred.26 
2. Pursuing a Complaint Through the Commission 
The Commission subchapter gives tenants who believe that they are 
victims of discrimination the option to file a complaint with the 
Commission27 or initiate a civil action against the alleged violator.28 If the 
tenant chooses to file a complaint with the Commission, the Commission 
must investigate the facts surrounding the allegations, issue an investigative 
report, and determine if there is a reasonable cause to believe that the 
allegations are true.29 From the moment the complaint is filed until the case 
is dismissed or a charge is filed, the statute requires the Commission to 
engage in conciliation efforts to reach an agreement between the parties.30 
Each case follows one of four possible courses of actions after the 
complaint is filed: (1) the parties enter into a binding conciliation agreement 
that can be enforced through a civil action;31 (2) the Commission finds that 
 
 21. Id. §§ 16-123-204, -206 (Repl. 2016). 
 22. Id. § 16-123-210 (Repl. 2016). 
 23. Id. §§ 16-123-203(b), -303 (Repl. 2016). 
 24. Id. §§ 16-123-301 to -348 (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2017). 
 25. Carol Johnson, About Us, STATE OF ARK. FAIR HOUSING COMMISSION, 
https://fairhousing.arkansas.gov/about-us (last visited July 31, 2018). 
 26. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-319, -324, -346. 
 27. Id. § 16-123-317. 
 28. Id. § 16-123-336. 
 29. Id. §§ 16-123-323, -324. 
 30. Id. § 16-123-321 (Supp. 2017). 
 31. Id. 
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there is no reasonable cause and the case will immediately be dismissed;32 
(3) the Commission finds that there is reasonable cause and it shall issue a 
charge;33 or (4) the aggrieved party chooses to terminate the administrative 
proceedings and file a civil action.34 Once the Commission files a charge, 
the Attorney General, the aggrieved party, or the respondent may elect to 
institute a civil action; otherwise, an administrative hearing will be held.35 
Finally, if the Commission determines at the administrative hearing that a 
violation has occurred, it may issue appropriate relief of actual damages, a 
civil penalty, and/or mandatory education for the violator.36 
An administrative hearing cannot be held if a civil action has begun,37 
and a civil action cannot begin if an administrative hearing has 
commenced,38 so the aggrieved party must necessarily decide whether she 
wishes to pursue her claim in the administrative setting or the judicial 
system. 
3. Pursuing a Complaint in the Judicial System 
If a person chooses to pursue her complaint of an AFHA violation 
through the judicial system, she may do so by filing a civil action in a court 
with competent jurisdiction within two years after the alleged violation.39 
The aggrieved party may file the action after a complaint has been filed with 
the Commission, but she may not file if she has entered into a conciliation 
agreement or the Commission has commenced an administrative hearing.40 
If the fact-finder finds that a violation has occurred, it may award 
compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, 
and if reasonable, a temporary or permanent injunction.41 
B. Purpose, Standard, and Application of Punitive Damages 
Substantive property law implications aside, Watkins is a vital decision 
for procedural law. The court’s holding with respect to punitive damages 
clarifies an obscure area of Arkansas’s civil procedure and is consistent with 
the purpose of punitive damages. A general understanding of the purposes, 
 
 32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-327 (Repl. 2016). 
 33. Id. § 16-123-325 (Repl. 2016). 
 34. Id. § 16-123-328 (Repl. 2016). 
 35. Id. §§ 16-123-329, -331 (Repl. 2016). 
 36. Id. § 16-123-332 (Repl. 2016). 
 37. Id. § 16-123-328 (Repl. 2016). 
 38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-336 (Repl. 2016). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. § 16-123-338 (Repl. 2016). 
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standards, and application of punitive damages is necessary to grasp the 
importance of the court’s clarification. 
1. Purpose of Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages exist for two purposes, the first of which is to punish 
the wrongdoer.42 Unlike compensatory damages, the fact-finder does not 
award punitive damages to compensate the aggrieved party but rather to 
inflict a penalty for undesirable behavior; thus punitive damages serve a 
retributive function.43 Even though the core purpose of punitive damages is 
punishment, they also serve the secondary purpose of deterring the 
wrongdoer, and other potential wrongdoers, from engaging in the 
undesirable conduct in the future.44 Essentially, punitive damages fulfill this 
deterrent function by placing a heavy financial burden on the wrongdoer, in 
addition to the obligations that the law places on the wrongdoer, to provide a 
more substantial disincentive.45 
2. Standard for Assessing Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are proper when the plaintiff proves by clear and 
convincing evidence46 that the defendant is liable for compensatory 
damages, knew that his or her conduct would naturally and probably result 
in injury or damage, and that he or she continued the conduct with malice.47 
It is counterintuitive for the statute to require an award of compensatory 
damages before punitive damages may be awarded when punitive damages 
are designed to punish the wrongdoer rather than to compensate the injured 
party; however, the requirement ensures that the plaintiff has actually 
suffered an injury for which the wrongdoer should be punished.48 
Though the plaintiff must prove each element listed above, the key to 
getting an award of punitive damages is to provide evidence of malicious 
conduct.49 Malice is typically defined as ill-will, but the Arkansas Judiciary 
defines it more specifically as situations in which the defendant 
“intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing injury 
 
 42. Jim Ray, Inc. v. Williams, 99 Ark. App. 315, 321, 260 S.W.3d 307, 310 (2007). 
 43. James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 REV. 
LITIG. 419, 422 (1995) (discussing the role of punitive damages in the “gray area” between 
the compensatory nature of civil law and the retributive/deterrent nature of criminal law). 
 44. BRILL & BRILL, supra note 11, § 9:1. 
 45. Id. 
 46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-207 (Repl. 2016). 
 47. Id. § 16-55-206 (Repl. 2016). 
 48. BRILL & BRILL, supra note 11, § 9:5. 
 49. Id. 
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or damage.”50 The Arkansas Court of Appeals does not require that a 
defendant acted with malice in order to affirm a finding of malice; it will 
also affirm when the defendant acted wantonly or “with such a conscious 
indifference to the consequences that malice can be inferred.”51 As long as 
there is substantial evidence to support a claim for punitive damages, the 
issue is a question for the jury.52 
3. Procedural Safeguards 
Once a jury or judge awards punitive damages, there are various ways 
for a defendant to challenge the award. First, as long as the defendant raised 
an objection at trial, he or she may file an appeal arguing that there was 
insufficient evidence for an award of punitive damages.53 When a court is 
reviewing a jury award, it will reverse the award if there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant the award,54 but if a judge served as the trier of fact, the 
award may only be reversed if it is clearly erroneous.55 
An unhappy defendant is also entitled to challenge an award of 
punitive damages for being excessive.56 In Arkansas, an award for damages 
will only be adjusted or overturned if it “shocks the conscience of the court” 
or shows that the trier of fact was prejudiced.57 Furthermore, a defendant can 
request a new trial if his or her rights have been substantially affected by 
excessive damages or there was an error in the assessment of the amount of 
recovery,58 seek relief from a judgment if he or she was not personally 
served with process,59 or move to set aside a default judgment if the 
statutory requirements for such a motion are met.60 All of these remedies 
protect defendants from an unjust ruling. 
C. Case Histories 
1. Tricou v. ACI Management, Inc. 
In Tricou, a case where default judgment was entered as a discovery 
sanction, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s award of 
 
 50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206(2). 
 51. D’Arbonne Const. Co. v. Foster, 354 Ark. 304, 308, 123 S.W.3d 894, 898 (2003). 
 52. In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 586 F.3d 547, 571 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 53. Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 49, 111 S.W.3d 346, 357 (2003). 
 54. McCoy v. Montgomery, 370 Ark. 333, 341, 259 S.W.3d 430, 436 (2007). 
 55. Entertainer, Inc. v. Duffy, 2012 Ark. 202, at 11, 407 S.W.3d 514, 521. 
 56. Advocat, 353 Ark. at 49, 111 S.W.3d at 357. 
 57. Id. at 43, 111 S.W.3d at 353. 
 58. ARK. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (2016). 
 59. ARK. R. CIV. P. 60(k) (2016). 
 60. ARK. R. CIV. P. 55(c) (2016). 
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punitive damages.61 The award amounted to double punishment for the 
discovery violations given the facts in the record.62 Watkins clarified the 
court’s holding and limited it to the circumstances present in Tricou.63 
a. The facts and procedural history   
The original dispute in Tricou involved allegations of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, but the conflict between the parties escalated when the 
defendants refused to comply with discovery requests for “certain” 
information.64 Even after the plaintiff filed a motion to compel and the trial 
court granted the motion, the defendants ignored the plaintiff’s numerous 
requests for the information.65 Eventually, the plaintiff requested that the 
trial court sanction the defendants for their noncompliance in the form of 
summary judgment.66 
Immediately after the plaintiff filed the motion for summary judgment 
the defendants delivered the requested information; however, the trial court 
had issued the order to compel seven months earlier, so the court entered 
default judgment as a sanction for the discovery violations.67 The trial court 
awarded compensatory damages and $95,000 in punitive damages, but it did 
not report any finding of conduct that warranted such a severe punishment.68 
b. Appellate review 
When the defendants appealed, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held 
that the award of punitive damages was improper due to that lack of 
finding.69 On the one hand, punitive damages were improper if they were 
awarded for the defendants’ conduct prior to the lawsuit because the 
evidence did not support such an award.70 Specifically, the requisite 
malicious conduct—express or implied—was not apparent in the facts in the 
record.71 On the other hand, if the trial court awarded punitive damages in 
addition to default judgment as a response to the failure to comply with the 
 
 61. Tricou v. ACI Mgmt., Inc., 37 Ark. App. 51, at 59, 823 S.W.2d 924, 929. 
 62. Id. at 59, 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 63. Watkins v. Turner, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 8, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 64. Tricou, 37 Ark. App. at 53, 823 S.W.2d at 925. 
 65. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 925. 
 66. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 925. 
 67. Id. at 54, 823 S.W.2d at 926. 
 68. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 926. 
 69. Id. at 60, 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 70. Tricou, 37 Ark. App. at 60, 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 71. Id. at 59, 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
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discovery order, the award amounted to double punishment.72 The appellate 
court held that the award was not justified under either theory.73 
The plaintiff in Tricou did not present evidence to the circuit court that 
the defendants acted willfully and maliciously, and the failure to do so was 
the focus of the appellate court’s decision.74 Even though the court 
emphasized that the crucial factor was that lack of evidence, at least one 
commentator interpreted the holding to mean that the court banned punitive 
damages in all cases where a default judgment was granted as a discovery 
sanction.75 
For years there was uncertainty regarding that issue and it was not 
addressed again until the Arkansas Court of Appeals revisited it in Watkins 
v. Turner, a case featuring a defendant who exhibited obviously malicious 
conduct, and the court clarified that its previous holding was not a blanket 
ban.76 
2. Watkins v. Turner 
Because Watkins is the subject of this note and the nature of its facts 
contribute to its significance, a thorough discussion of the facts is necessary. 
Not only did the facts of the case lead to a different result than the one in 
Tricou,77 they also prompted the landmark appellate decision to enforce the 
AFHA.78 
a. The facts 
The landlord in Watkins, who would later be the defendant, became 
frustrated when the tenants continuously made late rental payments, so he 
decided to evict them.79 The situation became hostile when the tenants 
requested the eviction notice that they were entitled to by law and rather 
than take advantage of Arkansas’s landlord-friendly laws and evict them 
properly, the landlord held the couple and their young child at gunpoint, 
informed them that the gun was their eviction notice, and made several 
racist comments.80  
 
 72. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 73. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 74. Id., 823 S.W.2d at 929. 
 75. BRILL & BRILL, supra note 11, § 9:4. 
 76. Watkins v. Turner, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 8, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 77. Id. at 7, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 78. Id. at 6–9, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 79. Id. at 1–2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 80. Id. at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
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The couple was terrified for their lives and for their child’s life and 
quickly called the police.81 While waiting for the police to arrive, the 
landlord continued to make veiled threats and suggested that the police force 
would not take any action against him if he chose to make good on those 
threats.82 Once officers removed the landlord from the scene, the tenants left 
the premises immediately and were afraid to return for their belongings for a 
few days following the confrontation.83 When the tenants returned to the 
residence to collect their things, they were dismayed to learn that all of their 
belongings were either outside and ruined, or locked inside the house and 
inaccessible.84 
Eventually, the tenants filed a complaint against the landlord for 
violating the Arkansas and federal Fair Housing Acts, among other claims, 
and sought compensatory and punitive damages.85 Despite the severity of 
the claims against him, the defendant did not file a timely answer.86 
b. Procedural history 
After he was granted leave to file an untimely answer because of poor 
health, the defendant repeatedly refused to comply with discovery requests 
which prompted the plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment.87 When 
the defendant ignored the motion and numerous notices of the hearing for it, 
the trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant had “willfully 
failed and refused to comply with the rules regarding discovery” and that 
“[h]e should not be allowed to proceed further by way of defense of this 
matter.”88 At the damages hearing, the trial court did not consider any 
evidence by the defendant on the issue of liability; rather, it accepted the 
facts as alleged by the plaintiffs as true.89 However, the court specifically 
told the defendant that he was entitled to offer evidence on the issue of 
damages.90 He did not, so the court entered a judgment requiring the 
defendant to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost property and for the 
fright and horror that his actions caused them.91 In addition, it awarded each 
plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages, stating that the facts were particularly 
 
 81. Id., 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 82. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 5, 2016 WL 903765, at *3. 
 83. Id. at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 84. Id. at 5, 2016 WL 903765, at *3. 
 85. Id. at 1, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 86. Id. at 2, 2016 WL 903765, at *1. 
 87. Id. at 3–4, 2016 WL 903765, at *2. 
 88. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 5, 2016 WL 903765, at *2. 
 89. Id. at 6, 2016 WL 903765, at *3. 
 90. Id. at 5–6, 2016 WL 903765, at *3. 
 91. Id. at 6–7, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
470 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
appalling and that it would not tolerate racial prejudice under Arkansas law 
or in its courtroom.92 
c. Appellate review 
On appeal, the defendant relied heavily on Tricou and argued that the 
award of compensatory and punitive damages from the default judgment 
awarded as a discovery sanction amounted to double punishment.93 The 
defendant did not argue the point at trial and thus failed to preserve his 
arguments for appeal so the court did not decide the issue on its merits; 
however, it went on to say that it would have affirmed the trial court on the 
merits because the trial court had specifically noted that the defendant 
engaged in willful and malicious conduct that warranted the imposition of 
punitive damages.94 
It also emphasized that in this case the award of punitive damages was 
not double-punishment for the failure to comply with discovery; rather it 
was imposed because of the separate and distinct fact that the defendant’s 
conduct was so deplorable.95 Watkins was unlike Tricou because the trial 
court made a finding of the defendant’s willful, malicious conduct that 
warranted punitive damages while the court in Tricou did not give any 
reason at all for imposing punitive damages.96 
d. Distinguished from Tricou 
Thus, it was the trial court’s specific finding of malicious conduct in 
Watkins that distinguished it from Tricou and made the award of punitive 
damages proper despite the default judgment for failure to comply with 
discovery.97 Watkins clarified the result in Tricou and limited its restriction 
on punitive damages in a “default judgment as a discovery sanction” case to 
those in which there is no evidence of malicious conduct.98 
III. WATKINS IS A VALUABLE ADDITION TO ARKANSAS’S LANDLORD-
TENANT LAW 
Watkins is a relatively short, simple decision and even with its 
outlandish facts it could easily be overlooked; however, when the Arkansas 
 
 92. Id. at 6, 2016 WL 903765, at *3. 
 93. Id. at 7, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 94. Watkins, 2016 Ark. App. 158, at 8, 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 95. Id., 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 96. Id., 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 97. Id., 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
 98. Id., 2016 WL 903765, at *4. 
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Court of Appeals set its first precedent for enforcing the AFHA, it provided 
much needed support to victims of housing discrimination. Watkins is 
monumental for Arkansas because housing discrimination inconspicuously 
occurs in the state every day,99 the administrative system is not always able 
to provide the protection that tenants need, and victims of housing 
discrimination tend to be more successful in the federal court system. 
For those reasons, it is imperative that Arkansas not only have laws 
that prohibit discrimination, but that it also actively enforces those laws to 
give them teeth.100 Watkins is the first step toward creating a robust body of 
case law for combating housing discrimination in Arkansas, which will 
inevitably facilitate the administration of justice within Arkansas state 
courts, so this deceptively simple case is truly a landmark decision. 
A. Housing Discrimination in Arkansas Occurs Too Frequently Without 
Repercussions 
Despite the Legislature and Commission’s goal to eradicate 
discriminatory housing practices, the multiple impediments to fair housing 
in Arkansas101 and continued discrimination102 across the state indicate that 
too many Arkansans are still becoming victims. The Arkansas Judiciary has 
a duty to enforce anti-discrimination laws to protect its citizens, especially 
when the administrative system is burdened with obstacles.103 Studies 
suggest that housing discrimination is rampant in Arkansas, further proving 
that Watkins was critical and overdue.104 
The National Fair Housing Alliance (“NFHA”), a private organization 
that fights housing discrimination nationwide, tested for housing 
discrimination in Little Rock, Arkansas in 2013, and the results were 
disappointing.105 The experiment included a series of investigations where 
numerous testers called and/or visited apartment complexes to request rental 
information.106 Discrimination was quickly evident as white testers 
 
 99. David Koon, Fair Housing Group Testing Rental Bias in Little Rock: 
“Discrimination with a Smile,” ARK. TIMES (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/fair-housing-group-testing-rental-bias-in-little-
rock/Content?oid=3334900. 
 100. See Jason Bailey, The Fight for Fair Housing in Arkansas, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW (Apr. 15, 2016), https://lawyerscommittee.org/2016/04/fight-
fair-housing-arkansas/. 
 101. J-QUAD PLANNING GRP., LLC, STATE OF ARKANSAS ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO 
FAIR HOUSING CHOICE, at ii (2014). 
 102. Koon, supra note 99. 
 103. See infra Part III.B. 
 104. See infra Part III.B. 
 105. Koon, supra note 99. 
 106. Id. 
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immediately received applications while minorities repeatedly did not 
receive applications or received them after a twelve-day delay.107 The NFHA 
filed complaints against two apartment complexes, but it also collected 
evidence of numerous other rental properties across the city engaging in 
discriminatory practices.108 
In the 2014 “State of Arkansas Analysis of Impediments to Fair 
Housing Choice” (“Analysis”), J-Quad Planning Group (“J-Quad”) cited 
discrimination against large families, minorities, those in low 
socioeconomic positions, and the elderly as its biggest concerns.109 J-Quad 
conducted an analysis of the current state of fair housing choice in Arkansas 
and recommended remedial actions to improve it.110 It hosted focus groups 
across the state in order to obtain data straight from communities within 
Arkansas,111 and participants in the focus groups confirmed that various 
forms of housing discrimination are present throughout the state.112 The 
focus groups expressed concern over the amount of discrimination that 
occurs and suggested that mitigation of discriminatory practices needs to be 
increased.113 
Both J-Quad and NFHA’s investigations indicate that an unacceptable 
level of discriminatory housing practices exists in Arkansas. One 
explanation is that many tenants are unaware of their rights.114 People cannot 
bring forth claims unless they know that they are entitled to fair housing 
opportunities or that their experience constitutes a violation of the AFHA,115 
so education is a critical component in the fight against housing 
discrimination. Perhaps a growing body of case law of AFHA enforcement, 
stemming from Watkins, will spread awareness of fair housing rights and 
opportunities. 
B. Claimants Face Numerous Obstacles When Pursuing a Complaint 
Through the Administrative System 
Unfortunately, even if a victim is well aware of his or her rights, the 
pursuit of a claim against the wrongdoer is not without additional obstacles. 
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Various issues often impede the pursuit and resolution of individual cases116 
and the Commission often faces challenges to the administrative system as a 
whole.117 The potential for the Commission to be abolished increases 
Watkins’ significance to landlord-tenant law. Without an agency dedicated 
to eradicating housing discrimination in Arkansas, the judiciary will have an 
even greater obligation to provide victims with an alternative to the 
administrative system, and there is no doubt that challenges to the 
Commission will continue to be brought in the future. 
1. Valid Claims Are Often Unresolved Due to Various Impediments 
When the NFHA’s investigations led them to file complaints in the 
administrative system, it became apparent that justice is not easily obtained. 
One of the complaints was against Waterford Apartments, a complex that 
was unsuccessfully sued for discriminatory practices in 1998.118 
When the Commission investigated the NFHA’s complaint in 2014 it 
found reasonable cause to believe that Waterford Apartments engaged in 
discriminatory practices, and it referred the case to the Arkansas Attorney 
General.119 
A spokesperson for the Arkansas Attorney General confirmed that the 
complaint was received and said the office would be visiting with clients to 
discuss the next step.120 To date, no case has been filed and this researcher 
was unable to locate any additional statements regarding the complaint. 
The most recent data released by the Commission shows that 
reasonable cause is found in a low percentage of claims, in large part 
because it is difficult to find concrete evidence of discrimination.121 
Typically, discrimination is performed so subtly that even the tenant is 
unaware that it is occurring and it can be impossible to prove.122 In 2012, the 
Commission investigated 291 cases with allegations of fair housing 
violations.123 Of those 291, the Commission found reasonable cause to 
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conclude that violations may have occurred in 18 of them.124 Hearings for 
cause found were conducted in zero cases, while many cases were resolved 
with a conciliation agreement.125 
The Commission strives to place “Arkansas on the map for its 
enforcement of this very basic civil right.”126 Even so, its best efforts may be 
hindered by insufficient evidence to justify a judgment against the 
wrongdoer. Though all of the issues described above impede the 
Commission’s ability to do its job, the largest obstacle that it faces is a 
consistent stream of challenges to the AFHA itself.127 
2. The Commission Must Constantly Fight for the AFHA 
According to the Director of the Commission, she is often faced with 
challenges to the AFHA and she spends a large portion of her time trying to 
convince others that the AFHA is necessary.128 From the individual who 
believes that discrimination no longer exists making anti-discrimination 
laws unnecessary to the individual who feels that property owners are 
entitled to do as they see fit with their own property, there are a variety of 
opinions as to why the AFHA should not be in force.129 Even these 
everyday, unofficial challenges force the Commission to fight for the 
AFHA’s very existence, burdening the Commission and hindering it from 
effectively performing its duties.130 
Matters were further complicated during the 91st General Assembly 
when the House received a bill that proposed to abolish the Commission and 
transfer its functions to the Arkansas Development Finance Authority 
(ADFA).131 
On March 13, 2017, the House passed the bill and it was referred to the 
Senate Committee on Insurance and Commerce,132 but the bill died in a 
Senate Committee in May.133 Fortunately, the bill was unsuccessful; such a 
drastic change would be an additional impediment to combatting housing 
discrimination in Arkansas. By transferring the functions of the Commission 
to the ADFA, the General Assembly may have preserved an administrative 
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system,134 but it would have likely been ineffective. The Commission is 
dedicated solely to fighting housing discrimination, and it faces obstacles to 
its mission daily.135 If the Commission’s job is transferred to an agency that 
has additional responsibilities, the number of obstacles would multiply. This 
change would have been nothing more than an impediment to the General 
Assembly’s ultimate goal for the AFHA. 
The proposed bill of 2017 is not an isolated event. In October 2018, 
Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson proposed a state government 
reorganization plan that seeks to consolidate many of the state’s agencies.136 
Under this proposal, the Commission would be joined with the Office of 
Medicaid.137 If Hutchinson is reelected this fall, he plans to present the 
proposal to the legislature during its regular session beginning January 
2019.138 Though the proposal may never go into effect, it demonstrates that 
the Commission will continue to face challenges in the future. Consolidating 
the Commission with an agency that has an incongruent purpose will further 
hinder the Commission’s ability to its job, and make the administrative route 
a less viable option for victims of housing discrimination. 
C. Watkins Set Vital Precedent for Judicial Enforcement of the AFHA 
Many more cases are filed under the federal Fair Housing Act than the 
AFHA; which is curious given that the AFHA is modeled after the federal 
Fair Housing Act.139 Perhaps the reason is rooted in a greater likelihood of 
success in federal court. During 2017, the Department of Justice settled 43 
cases resulting in over $80 million in relief.140 Those cases were processed 
through the federal administrative system then referred to the Department of 
Justice, so the relief estimate does not include the undoubtedly larger 
number of cases that were independently litigated. An $80 million recovery 
for the year is impressive, particularly when considering that Arkansas has 
just seen its first instance of appellate enforcement of the AFHA.141 
Watkins was the first Arkansas appellate decision that contained 
allegations of an AFHA violation.142 The lack of claims filed in the State’s 
judicial system may also be attributable to the facts that many victims of 
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housing discrimination are members of a low socioeconomic class without 
access to legal representation and that many tenants are unaware of their 
legal rights.143 Whatever the reason is for the lack of case law in this area, 
precedent is critical to advancing individual rights, stabilizing this area of 
law, and making anti-discrimination law more predictable.144 
For that reason, Watkins was necessary and remarkable. When the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of 
discriminatory practices, it proved that Arkansas’s judicial system is 
available to protect Arkansans when the administrative process cannot. If 
more cases are filed in state court, more favorable precedent can be set and a 
predictable body of case law will develop that stringently enforces the 
AFHA and helps to eradicate housing discrimination within the state. 
IV. WATKINS’ HOLDING SAFEGUARDS THE PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. Punitive Damages Should Be Available in “Default Judgment Awarded 
as a Discovery Sanction” Cases 
In addition to the ramifications that Watkins has for landlord-tenant 
law,145 the decision also contributes to Arkansas Civil Procedure. By 
limiting its Tricou holding to prohibit punitive damages in cases where 
default judgment was entered as a discovery sanction only where there is no 
finding of conduct warranting punitive damages, the court preserved the 
function and purpose of punitive damages. 
1. Policy Arguments Weigh in Favor of Allowing Punitive Damages 
in Cases that Reach Disposition Through a Default Judgment 
Awarded as a Discovery Sanction 
Though strong arguments weigh both in favor of and against a blanket 
ban on punitive damages in cases where default judgment is awarded as a 
discovery sanction, the public policies of punishing wrongdoers and 
deterring malicious conduct indicate that such a ban would ultimately have a 
negative effect on society. 
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a. A blanket ban on punitive damages in these cases would 
undermine the purpose of punitive damages 
The primary argument against a blanket ban on punitive damages in 
cases where the disposition was reached through a default judgment entered 
as a discovery sanction is that it would thwart the purpose of punitive 
damages. If the aforementioned ban were instituted the judiciary would 
essentially create the opportunity for any defendant to circumvent the 
imposition of punitive damages by simply ignoring discovery requests then 
failing to comply with the resulting discovery orders.146 That unmistakable 
opportunity would be contrary to the purpose of punitive damages147 and the 
public policy of holding bad actors accountable for their actions. 
As discussed, punitive damages are designed to punish particularly bad 
actors.148 If a defendant could so easily escape punishment for his or her 
horrendous conduct on a technicality, that purpose would be negated 
completely. The once unassuming technicality would lead to the loss of both 
the retributive function and the cautionary function, and potentially lead to 
an increase in undesirable conduct. 
It is intuitive that a truly guilty defendant, facing a high likelihood of 
losing his or her case in court, would ignore discovery requests and orders 
so that he or she could escape a more excessive punishment than mere 
liability. Because punitive damages are specifically calculated to punish 
wrongdoers to such a degree that they will refrain from repeating the 
malicious conduct, whatever compensatory liability might be imposed on 
the defendant would inevitably be significantly less burdensome than a 
massive monetary award of punitive damages.149 Not only would those 
defendants escape the punishment their actions merit, they would also cease 
to serve as an effective example to others.150 
Conversely, a defendant that knows that he or she is innocent and has a 
strong case would have less of an incentive to abuse the loophole because it 
would be preferable for him or her to avoid liability altogether. If the 
defendant respects the system, cooperates in discovery, and prevails at the 
conclusion of the case, he or she will be burdened with neither 
compensatory nor punitive damages; the probability of no liability at all is 
more alluring than the certainty of defeat and liability for a wrong that you 
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did not commit. Thus, if the described ban does not work to protect the 
innocent defendant, it follows that those it would protect would be the very 
ones that it should not. The logical inference is that preventing an award of 
punitive damages in cases with default judgments frustrates the purpose of 
punitive damages and undermines the credibility of the judicial system. 
However, it is possible that a blanket ban on punitive damages in such cases 
would provide an extra layer of protection for innocent defendants. 
b. Alternatively, a blanket ban on punitive damages in these 
cases could reduce the likelihood that an innocent, 
uninformed defendant receives unwarranted punishment 
Once a default judgment has been entered, liability is established and 
the defendant is not allowed to dispute the facts as presented by the 
plaintiff.151 This poses a concern that punitive damages will be imposed on 
innocent parties who are not permitted to adequately defend themselves, a 
possibility that public policy cannot permit. 
Ironically, such a significant burden on an innocent party would also 
run contrary to the purpose of punitive damages.152 Punitive damages are 
strongly disfavored by the law and are intentionally limited in order to 
prevent courts from excessively burdening those under their authority.153 So, 
in addition to the humanitarian concerns that the potential for such an 
injustice presents, it must be noted that purpose of punitive damages could 
be threatened if the previously discussed ban is not instituted. 
There are situations in which innocent parties may not personally 
receive notice of discovery requests and are unaware that discovery 
sanctions—including default judgment—are looming. It may be unfair for 
such parties to be held liable, but it would be completely unconscionable for 
them to pay punitive damages if their lack of participation in the litigation 
was through no fault of their own. 
c. The procedural safeguards within the law of damages 
adequately protect innocent parties 
Even though public policy concerns over innocent parties receiving 
undeserved harsh punishments may indicate that a ban on punitive damages 
in cases where default judgment is entered as a discovery sanction is a 
desirable law to establish, the structure of our judicial system and the rules 
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of civil procedure counteract those concerns. All defendants have ample 
opportunity to respond to discovery requests and comply with discovery 
orders so that they will not be sanctioned with a default judgment, and in the 
event that a default judgment is awarded, there are procedures for setting 
aside the judgment when it would be equitable to do so.154 
Furthermore, at some point the judiciary has to make a choice. It can 
preserve the retributive and cautionary functions that punitive damages are 
intended to serve or worry about the highly unlikely event in which an 
innocent person is sanctioned with a default judgment, for failure to comply 
with discovery, and with punitive damages. Not only would that rare 
individual have the opportunity to appeal and turn to our judicial system’s 
resources for getting out of the undeserved punishment, but society also 
retains the benefit of punishing the truly evil and malicious. 
For example, in Watkins, the court ordered the defendant to comply 
with discovery requests multiple times, yet he refused to respond.155 After 
multiple notices and numerous opportunities to prevent default judgment 
from being entered, the defendant elected to ignore the lawsuit and thereby 
forfeited his chance to participate in the dispute.156 
If defendants, such as the defendant in Watkins, refuse to comply with 
discovery by ignoring the threat of a default judgment, then concerns 
surrounding their inability to dispute the facts as presented by the plaintiff 
carry a lot less weight. Perhaps a refusal to cooperate in the lawsuit justifies 
whatever misfortune falls on the problematic party; however, the procedural 
safeguards discussed above will provide individuals with relief from unfair 
punishments that result from no wrongdoing on their part. 
Punitive damages are not awarded unless malicious conduct is present 
which requires more than a showing of mere improper conduct; such a 
significant requirement reduces the chances of an innocent party being 
unjustifiably harmed.157 The facts of a given case have to provide substantial 
evidence of malice, express or implied, on which a judge or jury can base an 
award of punitive damages before the award will be affirmed on appeal.158 It 
seems unlikely that such a finding could be made on anything less than a 
sturdy foundation, such as reliable evidence that an unprovoked landlord 
threatened his tenants at gunpoint, which ensures that the procedures of our 
laws provide significant protection from the possibility of these concerns 
becoming a reality. 
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals correctly aligned Arkansas law with 
public policy when it affirmed the award of punitive damages in Watkins. 
Even if a case in an Arkansas state court ends with a default judgment 
granted as a discovery sanction, punitive damages will be available to serve 
the retributive and deterrent functions and to benefit society as a whole.159 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is distressing that the plaintiffs in Watkins v. Turner suffered from 
discriminatory practices so egregious that punitive damages were necessary 
to adequately punish the defendant. However, their experience presented the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals with an opportunity to stringently enforce the 
AFHA and set precedent in an unchartered area of Arkansas appellate law.160 
Through their tragedy, they initiated a change in Arkansas’s approach to 
housing discrimination cases. 
The court also took the opportunity to clarify its prior holding in 
Tricou161 that has been interpreted as placing a blanket ban on punitive 
damages in all cases that reached disposition through a default judgment 
entered for discovery violations.162 Worthy arguments can be identified in 
support of a blanket ban on damages in that specific scenario, but the 
holding of Watkins ensures that Arkansas’s case law is consistent with the 
purpose that punitive damages are designed to fulfill.163 At a minimum, 
aggrieved Arkansans and their attorneys can find relief in this decision, for 
they can rest assured that the most malicious actors will continue to be 
punished to the fullest extent allowed under our law without the ability to 
circumvent the system through a mere technicality. Watkins makes crucial 
contributions to both Arkansas Civil Procedure and landlord-tenant law, and 
it is an invaluable piece of Arkansas precedent. 
Tasha L. Strickland
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